In the fast-paced world of international diplomacy, secrets are rarely kept, and behind closed doors, stories of chaos and negotiation often emerge. Such is the case with the 2005-2007 nuclear negotiations between India and the United States. This article unravels the tangled web of discussions, disagreements, and ultimately, successful compromises that shaped this historic chapter in India’s diplomatic history.
MEA vs. DAE: Clash of Priorities
The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) found themselves on opposite ends of the spectrum during these pivotal negotiations. While the MEA was keen on embracing several US demands, especially those related to placing critical nuclear facilities under international safeguards, the DAE stood firm, raising concerns that could have potentially jeopardized India’s nuclear weapons program.
This internal discord was not a well-kept secret, but the official confirmation of this dissonance comes from former Indian diplomat D.B. Venkatesh Varma in a recently published essay. Varma’s chapter, featured in R. Chidambaram’s memoir “India Rising,” not only highlights the role of noted scientist Chidambaram in shaping India’s diplomatic stance but also sheds light on the divisions within the Indian delegation.
Divisions Within the Indian Establishment
Chidambaram, who served as the principal scientific adviser to three prime ministers from 2001 to 2018, and Varma, a director in the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) during the critical years of 2004-2007, were at the forefront of these negotiations. Varma, in particular, played a pivotal role in negotiating the India-US nuclear deal, earning recognition with the S.K. Singh Award for Excellence in the Indian Foreign Service.
Varma’s recollections reveal significant differences between the DAE, the PMO, and the MEA at various stages of the negotiations. The key point of contention revolved around the strategic cost that India was willing to bear in exchange for the removal of international trade restrictions on its nuclear industry.
The Showdown in Washington
The climax of this internal struggle occurred on the eve of the signing of the joint statement on July 18, 2005. The Indian delegation in Washington was deeply divided on the price India should pay for the removal of trade restrictions. Anil Kakodkar, the chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission, was a lone voice pointing out the pitfalls in the initial drafts of the joint statement. He found support from M.K. Narayanan, the National Security Adviser, and the PMO’s team. However, others were inclined to accept what the Americans were offering, even if it meant compromising India’s nuclear weapons program.
Kakodkar’s public stance during this critical meeting chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh led to significant changes in the final draft of the joint statement. With Manmohan Singh insisting on Kakodkar’s assent, the document was revised to accommodate the concerns raised.
The Long Road to Agreement
The joint statement in 2005 marked the beginning of several challenging years of negotiations. India had to develop a separation plan for its civil and nuclear facilities while agreeing to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and an additional protocol.
The US had initially pushed for a large portion of India’s nuclear facilities to fall under IAEA safeguards. The pressure from the US and other Western countries found some support within India’s ranks. Varma writes that Anil Kakodkar, based on his suggestion to NSA Narayanan, formed an “apex group” in September 2005 to establish a unified stance. This group played a critical role in shaping the negotiation strategy.
The ‘Grid Connectivity’ Controversy
One of the contentious issues was the US proposal of ‘grid connectivity’ as the basis for separating civilian from military nuclear facilities. This concept raised alarms within the DAE, as it would have meant subjecting most of India’s nuclear reactors to IAEA supervision. The MEA also tried to persuade the public that keeping the fast-breeder program out of the civilian list could scuttle the entire nuclear cooperation deal.
This lack of consensus and a disjointed approach resulted in chaos within the Indian delegation. While the MEA pursued its agenda independently, the DAE had difficulties agreeing with the MEA’s approach.
The Turning Point: ‘Corrective Measures’
As the negotiations progressed, the issue of US insistence on safeguards in perpetuity became a stumbling block. Talks between Indian and American representatives broke down on the eve of President George W. Bush’s state visit to India. India was willing to accept safeguards in perpetuity but sought a guarantee of a lifetime supply of nuclear fuel.
It was only after intensive discussions that Kakodkar and Chidambaram devised the concept of “corrective measures.” This construct allowed India to agree to safeguards in perpetuity while securing a lifetime guarantee of fuel supplies from the US.
Navigating the Hyde Act and Bilateral Inspections
Despite the challenges, India managed to protect its core interests in the 123 agreement. There was immense pressure from the US to allow bilateral inspections alongside IAEA safeguards. India firmly declined, with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh making a statement in Parliament that he did not want American inspectors roaming Indian nuclear facilities.
In the end, India achieved a nuclear deal where its civilian program had an adequate supply of nuclear fuel, and its weapons program continued unhindered. It was a delicate balance that, in retrospect, Varma describes as a success story, showcasing India’s ability to have its cake and eat it too.
In the world of diplomacy, where negotiations often involve complex trade-offs and high-stakes decisions, the India-US nuclear deal of 2005-2007 stands as a testament to India’s ability to navigate treacherous waters and protect its strategic interests.
