Secret Service agent in charge of Donald Trump's rally in Butler, Pennsylvania, on July 13 He was made aware of “credible intelligence” of a threat against the former president — but did not pass it on to his supervisor or others involved in planning the event’s security, a Senate report on the assassination attempt found.
A 94-page report on the firing released Wednesday by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations determined that the Secret Service's lead advance agent for the Trump rally wrote in a security planning document that “there was no adverse intelligence” regarding the 45th president's visit to Butler — despite reports of an unspecified threat.
Ahead, Main Agent Told Senate investigators that he informed special agents (SAIC) of the Secret Service's Pittsburgh field office about “credible intelligence” before the rally – but claims it never happened.
If Pittsburgh SAIC knew about the potential threat to Trump, Rally at Butler Farm Showground He told investigators it may have been taken inside the home.
Despite these damning findings, the lead agent and 11 other members of the Secret Service interviewed by investigators denied responsibility for any of the numerous security failures identified in the report.
These failures resulted in the death of rallyist Corey Comperatore, 50; rallyists David Deutch, 57, and James Copenhaver, 74, were seriously injured; and the 78-year-old former president was shot in the ear when the assassin, 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, opened fire from the roof of the American Glass Research Building.
“Credible intelligence” of a threat
secret Service Investigators found that counter snipers — including the sniper who had taken Crooks in his sights “mere seconds” before shooting and killing him — were dispatched to Butler in direct response to threat intelligence.
Their fortuitous deployment marked the first time that a Secret Service counter-sniper team was assigned to cover an event for someone other than the president, vice president, or a formally designated presidential candidate (Trump was the presumptive Republican nominee at the time of the rally).
The assistant director of the Secret Service's office of protective operations told investigators that agency officials had determined “prior to July 5” that counter-snipers would be present at all of Trump's outdoor events.
“In his interview with the committee, the USSS Assistant Director for OPO stated that the decision was based on a number of factors, including the size and scale of the former President's external programs, his impending nomination, and the threat information, at least some of which is classified,” the report said.
“To date, the committee has not been provided any additional details concerning the USSS decision,” the report further states, adding that “of the USSS personnel the committee interviewed, only two were made aware that there was a credible threat involving former President Trump prior to July 13, only one of whom was briefed on the classified information behind the threat.”
The report said the FBI indicated the bureau “was not aware” of Crooks prior to the assassination attempt.
“No adverse information”
The Secret Service's lead advance agent for the rally told investigators that on July 9 he received a phone call from “another supervisor of Trump's entourage” informing him that Secret Service counter snipers would be assigned to Butler because of “credible intelligence he could not discuss further with him.”
The lead agent claims he asked the other supervisor to call his supervisor – at the Pittsburgh field office SAIC – to discuss the “credible intelligence,” but he refused.
“He said he had credible intelligence that he could not disclose,” she told investigators.
When asked why the second supervisor could not call Pittsburgh SAIC, he replied, “I had information he could not pass on.”
“He didn't use the word 'confidential' over the phone, but from my common sense when you say you can't disclose something over the phone, that means it's confidential and he can't talk about it over the phone,” the lead agent said.
The agent claimed he informed Pittsburgh SAIC about the counter snipers who were being hired “because another supervisor had expressed that there was credible intelligence.”
According to the report, Pittsburgh SAIC denied that any such talks took place and said they first learned that the counter snipers were coming “through an e-mail requesting accommodations for them.”
“I didn't even know that such a request was made,” he told investigators.
When asked if he knew why he had been sent away, he replied, “I don't know.”
Pittsburgh SAIC said that had they been aware of the threat intelligence they “would have insisted the event be held indoors if it was deemed too risky for an outdoor venue.”
“Additionally, SAIC told the committee that it would have sought more assets had it received this information,” the report said.
In addition to not explicitly notifying his supervisor at the Pittsburgh field office, the lead agent wrote in the initial Butler rally survey document that “at this time, no adverse intelligence has been developed regarding this trip.”
“Any adverse information will be communicated to all working supervisors,” he said.
When asked about the apparent lies written on the document, the lead agent told investigators it was his “understanding” that “there was no adverse intelligence to disclose to the group as a whole.”
“It doesn't cover everything in terms of intelligence, whether it can be passed on or not,” he said of the document.
“If there was something confidential, like something I wasn't told initially, that also wouldn't be put in writing,” he said. “It would be given to the people who needed to know in the situation.”
His supervisor, Pittsburgh SAIC, said their expectation was that the initial survey would cover “any credible threats or intelligence.”
Assassination attempt was 'predictable and preventable'
The Senate report concluded that Crooks' ability to carry out the assassination attempt against Trump was “predictable” and “preventable” and was the result of “failures in planning, communications, security, and allocation of resources” by the Secret Service.
“These include unclear roles and responsibilities, inadequate coordination with state and local law enforcement, lack of effective communications, and nonfunctional (counter unmanned aircraft systems),” according to the report.
The committee also found that “unresolved communication and coordination problems” between federal, state, and local law enforcement officials were a reason for not responding promptly to Crooks' “suspicious” behavior prior to the shooting.
The report said that about a half-hour before the shooting, at least eight Secret Service agents became aware of a “suspicious” man with a rangefinder (Crooks).
The report further states that “key requests sent to the FBI, DHS, ATF, and (Secret Service) are still pending” and that most of the documents provided to investigators “have been significantly redacted.”
“This unnecessarily hindered the committee's ability to exercise its constitutional powers and obtain the information it needs to identify needed reforms,” the report said.
“These overly burdensome edits, including those relating to communications from individuals interviewed by the Committee, delayed the Committee's ability to conduct these interviews and conduct its investigation efficiently and effectively.”
